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of Belgian price regulation
J. JNTRODUCTION
An issue ofcontinuing political and economie significance in Belgium
concerns the desirability and the various effectsofthe price regulation
laws. The statues presently in force include the prior notification of
price increases and price calculation contracts. Discussions of these
instruments ofdirect price regulation have in the past largely focused
on their macroeconomic role and effectiveness (Van Meerhaeghe
(1968), Van Hecke (1976), Martens (1977)) oronthelegal issues invol-
ved (De Vroede (1976), Favresse (1977)). Analyses of the industrial
economie aspects ofthes~regulations, although not absent (Westphal
1970)), are scarce.
A renewed and more comprehensive investigation ofthese forms ~f
priceregulation appears warranted. Anycomparisonbetweenforms of
direct orindirect priee control must include an analysis oftheirecono-
mie consequences at both the level ofthe industry and the individual
firm. The mieroeconomics of indirect price regulation through the
promotion of competition are not completely understood, but their
investigation appears to have momentum (e.g. Philip (1977)). A eor-
responding analysis ofBelgian and other European schemes ofdirect
price regulation is needed to fully evaluate the industrial economic
effectsofcalculation and priornotification schemes, to unders.tand the
249economicforces supporting the continuationofprice regulation and to
analyze alternatives to the existing schemes.
Ifdirect price regulation is deemed to be appropriate, the design of
price regulation mechanisms to achieve the goals ofindustrial policy
must be considered. In the past the form of the regulatory schemes
appears primarily to have been the result ofpragmatic considerations.
The conception and executionofindl,lstrial policy shouldbebased ona
thoroughunderstanding, atbotha theoreticalandempiricallevel,ofthe
relation between the various instruments of this policy and the con-
sequent effects on the behavior andperformanceofthe industry. Price
regulation mechanisms are instruments ofindustrial policy that inter-
vene at a focal point ofnon-planned economies : outputprices. There-
fore theyhave animpactoneconomicdecisions thatarebasedonthose
prices and on actions affecting the prices that firms prefer. Price regu-
lation can be expected to influence employment, profits, the choice of
technology and input sources, product differentiation, productivity
improvements, R & D efforts, etc...
Theobjectiveofthispaperis nottopresenta comprehensiveanalysis
of these matters but instead is to raise a number of issues and to
stimulate interest in the study of the industrial economic aspects of
price regulation mechanisms. While the discussion will be in the con-
text of industrial sectors, much of the analysis is applicable mutatis
mutandi to an important part of non-industrial sectors as weIl.
In the next section the institutional characteristics of two existing
Belgian price regulation schemes are described. Reasons for the con-
tinued existence of these mechanisms are discussed in a following
section, afterwhichpossible economic effects ofexisting schemes and
more general considerations concerning the optimal design of price
regulation mechanisms are examined.
2. A summary oftwo Belgian price regulation mechanisms
The regulation ofprice increases through theprior notification proce-
durehas, sinceits introductionin 1950, beenthe subjectof26legislative
revisions (Bourgoignie (1977)). In its present form the law requires a
firm ora group offirms to submittothe MinistryofEconomic Affairs a
notification andjustification for any intended price increase. This ap-
plies with a numberofnotabie exceptions (forwhichotherrules apply)
to all prices of goods and services produced domestically by firms
above a specified size. A less restrictive stipulation is applicable for
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The notification dossier submitted contains a llumber of information
items including data on the evolution of costs and realized profits.
The notification date is followed by a lag during which the firms are
not allowed to increase their price(s). At the end of this waiting lag
firms mayraise priceby thenotifiedamountiftheMinisterdid not react
or by some smaller amount «recommended» by the Minister. The lag
has two purposes. First, it permits the regulatory authorities to
examine the dossiers and to prepare recommendations as detailed
below. Second, it is used as an instrument of macroeconomic policy
andis extendedorshortenedto affect the rate ofinflation (see Martens
(1977)). Firms are not obligated to follow the Minister's recommenda-
tions regardingthe maximum price, but ifthey choose not t~, the lag can
beextended bytwo months.Ifindividualfirms notified a price increase
the Minister can moreover impose a maximum price for six months.
This ofcourse tends to increase the regulatory powerofthe Minister.
The criteria used for the Minister's recommendations are hardly ex-
plicit and sometimes revised. Some form ofmark-up regulation seems
to be implicit probably in a varying degree supplemented by other
political, economic and social considerations.
The notification dossiers are investigated by the Price Admini-
stration ofthe Ministry ofEconomic Mfairs. They determine whether
an advice will be soughtoftheCommissionfortheRegulationofPrices
which is comprised ofrepresentatives ofgovernment, unions, private
industry and consumers. This commission (or a permanent committee
ofitincaseanindividualfirm notifies apriceincrease) mayconsultwith
thefirm(s) involvedand may seekthe consultofexperts. Theadviceof
the commission- whichneednotbeunanimous- is forwardedto the
Minister, who need not follow it. Hence a lot of room is left for the
administration and the Minister to apply judgrnent. The investigation
by the administration, the (possible) advice by the commission andthe
criteria guiding the Minister's recommendations, are not public.
Firms are exempted from the price notification procedure if they
either alone or as a group sign what can be called a price calculation
contract (<<programma overeenkomst» )withthe MinisterofEconomic
Mfairs. The contracts allow firms to calculate new prices in an agreed
upon manner, with further regulatory interference presumably limited
to checks on the properadministration ofthe agreements. Increases in
certain specified costitems can be passed on automatically into higher
output prices after some small delay. Decreases in these costs must
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typicaily contain other stipulations as weil (e.g. to limit resale price
maintenance). Theirofficialdesignationis actuaily misleadingsincethe
contracts are notlinkedin any specific way with governmentplanning.
Only a limited number of these contracts are presently in operation,
their content is secret.
Characteristics of both Belgian mechanisms can be found in other
European price regulation systems (Scheuer (1977)) and in the regula-
tion of U.S. public utilities for which rate increases are subject to
reviewby aregulatorycommission, withan attendantregulatorylag, or
are computed according to automatic revenue and fuel adjustment
clauses (see Kahn (1971), Kendrick (1975), Baron and De Bondt
(1978a)).
3. On the continued existence ofBelgian price regulation
Occasionaily, and with varying degrees ofvigour, demands or propo-
sals have been made to abolish, or at least render «inoperative», the
Belgian price regulation schemes. The most popular argument is that
other industrialized and presumably comparable countries that do not
use comprehensive direct price regulation butinsteademphasize com-
petition law, show superior industrial performance without enduring
higher rates ofinflation. This suggests that it is difficult to believe that
our price regulation is maintained because there is a consensus on its
superior effects on industrial performance and on macroeconomic va-
riables.
Therefore the foilowing question emerges : how can the continued
existence ofBelgian price regulation laws he explained ? A pertinent
subquestion is : what industries, IJ any, can we expect to oppose
vigorously the statues ? The conjecture made here is that the
maintained operation ofprice regulation results because it serves to a
varyingextentthe interests ofprivate industry andofunionlabor. This
support, ceteris paribus, is expectedto be stronger the less concentra-
ted and labor intensive the industry is.
Before turning to this explanation and its implications, consider
some other viewpoints that have been raised on the continued
existence ofthe Belgian price regulation system. The statues may give
the representatives ofgovernmentand laborunions a belief(illusion ?)
that they control, or at least are better able to monitor, the actions of
private industry. Another possibility is that bureaucratic interests on
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administrations and commissions. Still another possibility is that Bel-
gian businessmen, as good entrepreneurs and Belgians, know how to
lawfully get around the price regulations without too much damage to
their private interests ; that is, one does not oppose what does not
harm. While these possibilities are not to be dismissed, they are of
limited value in searching for a betterunderstanding ofourcontempo-
rary mixed economy. Among other things, they fail to answer the
subquestion raised above.
Apparently more fundamental but wrong is the reasoning ofcertain
leftist and consumerist muckrakers (see also Posner (1974)). Their
argument is that a number ofinstitutions in our society exist because
financial powers and big business control them to promote their own
private interest. An illustrationofthis viewpointemergedinthe recent
allegation that breweries and the Ministry ofEconomie Affairs did not
disagree on the introduction ofminimum consumer prices. One com-
mentator emphasized the private gains ofbig business (breweries and
distribution chains), deemphasizing the gains to small distributors (Van
Rijckeghem (1978)), although one may suspect that the latter benefits
inspiredthe public officials to not disagree with theprice floors. There
can be little doubt that governement regulation in general, and price
regulation decisions in particular, have also been inspired or been
dominated by the interests of small business or non-business groups,
including union labor. Ta understand the persistenee ofprice regula-
tion, we have thus to look beYOJ1d big business andfinancialpowers.
Another explanation of the continued existence of Belgian price
regulationis avariant ofStigler'seconomietheoryofregulation(Stigler
(1971), Posner (1974)). This theory prediets that discontent with price
regulation will be strongerthe more concentratedand capitalintensive
the industry is. Itis crucialto a properunderstanding ofthisprediction
to realizethatatendency is arguedandthatalsootherfactors determine
the interestgroups' attitude towards priceregulation, e.g. import com-
petition, importanee of its export activities, alternative government
intervention that one might consider likely, eet. The fact that con-
centratedandcapitalintensiveindustriespresently do notopposeprice
regulation is not a sufiïcient observation to disprove the tendency
claimed.
Prom the point ofview ofthe economie theory ofregulation, price
regulation would be expected to serve over time more and more the
private interests ofpolitical1y effectivegroups such as firms and union
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the same conditions, may realize that they can increase their total
private benefits by agreeing on a common price. The benefits ofsuch
cooperation(which shouldbegreatertheless elasticthe demandfor the
industry's product and the slower is new entry) do entail some direct
economic costs (besides !egal punishment which is largely irrelevant
for the Belgian scene anyway). These costs are associated with the
sellers arriving at an agreement on the price and with enforcing the
often implicit cooperation agreement against non-participants and de-
fectors. In the absenceofpriceregulationthesecosts mayoutweighthe
benefits, thus preventing price agreements to be reached at all or if
reached, leading to their rapid dissolution. The existence of price
regulation mechanisms can reverse such a balance by allowing a
cheaper substitute to private cartelization, since regulation typically
raises the benefits and lowers the costs ofcooperative industry beha-
vior. A list of supporting arguments includes the following. Industry
agreement regarding a common price or price formula enhances the
bargaining power to obtain a price increase or a calculation contract.
Therepetitiveness in preparingnotification dossiersoftenata sectorial
level not only stimulates, but requires, interfirm communication on
costandotherdata. Communicationthatotherwise may be a barrierto
industry cooperation receives an official rationalization under price
regulation. Disagreements among industry members on a acceptable
commonprice hardly threatens theircooperation since the responsibi-
lity for price decisions ultimately rests with the Ministry. The incen-
tives to price cutting which always threaten the continuanceofa price
agreement are severely tempered by the prior notification procedure
which encourages price ceilings to become price floors (Jacquemin
(1977)). (Some provisions have attemptedto counteractthis tendency.
Succesfully ?).Pricereductions as actions ofintra-industryrivalry are
discouraged by certain calculation contracts. The likelihood ofdefec-
tion is much smaller than it would be with a private cooperative agree-
mentgiven the legal characterofthe contracts (oneoftheundersigned
is the Minister ofEconomic Affairs) and the implications ofnon-com-
pliance.
The weakestopposition to price regulation would be expected from
industries where cooperation without the helping hand ofgovernment
interventionis infeasible or difficult (costly). The discontent with such
regulation should therefore decrease as private industry cooperation
becomes more difficult, i.e. as concentration decreases, as cost struc-
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costs structures and product characteristics become more dissimilar,
as fixed costs increase relative to total cost, etc... (see Scherer (1971)
for a discussion of the factors limiting private industry cooperation).
The interests union labor may have in price regulation or regulation
in generalare diverse. Especiaily the practice ofsectorial dossiers can
be seenas devicetobuildbarries la exit (offirms)outofanindustryand
thus to assure protection ofemployment in the short-run. (The infor-
mation flow through the Price Administration presumably is con-
ductive to the creation ofbarries la enlry as well). The political rele-
vance ofunion interest should be larger the more labor intensive the
industry is.
These arguments lead to the cOIljecture that greater private support
for price regulation would result the less the industry is concentrated
and more laborintensive it is. Although this tendency does not appear
unreasonable from casual observations, a scientific verification would
require less simplification. The attitudes ofprivate industry and union
labortowards priceregulationare also affectedbyotherfactors suchas
alternative government interventions that are considered likely as sub-
stitutesfor orcomplementstothisregulation, theimportanceofimport
competition and export activities, the reduction in profits and employ-
ment, etc... These elements render the detection of this relationship
more difficult although they can be incorporated into the framework
detailed above.
The analysis also applies mutatis mutandito an importantpartofthe
non-industrial sectors. The opposition to a competition law can be
understood in this context. In addition to weil known reasons (among
whichis a disagreementoneconomic systems), onecanexpectopposi-
tion towards an effective competion law from both concentrated and
unconcentrated private sectors, although for different reasons. Con-
centrated sectors can hardly be expected to support a law which cen-
ters on abuses ofdominant positions. Any opposition they may have
against price regulation is thus seriously moderated. Only «improve-
ments» in price regulation mechanisms are asked for. The unconcen-
trated sectors are in camparisan little threatened by the competition
law (atleastthe Belgianpre-proposal) butthey mayfearthat sucha law
is the beginning of the end of the favorable price regulation me-
chanisms.
The central conjecture was that the persistence of Belgian price
regulation laws should be related to the politicaily effective private
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industry and union labor are relatively satisfied with price regulation,
why should there be any opposition to such mechanisms ? An econo-
mic analysis of this issue should begin with the observation that the
benefits to society of price regulation (reducing the rate of inflation,
private gains to industry and labor, income distribution, etc...)ifthey
arepresent, may entailcostsalso. These costsare inBelgiumandother
European countries not completely understood either in terms oftheir
theoretical or empirical relevance. Improper administration or mana-
gement of the regulatory process orpoliticalfailures are not at issue
here. A potentiaUy morerelevantfocus couldbeonthecostsassociated
with the many-sided effects resulting from often non-apparent incen-
tives or disincentives created by the price regulation mechanisms.
These include an absence ofconcern for the level ofprices and for the
consumer. Attention couldsimultaneously go to waysofcounteracting
undesirableeffects. Theseissuesareelaboratedoninthenextsections.
4. Industrial economie effectsofexistingprice regulation mechanisms
A central feature of many prior-notified price increases and of price
calculation contracts is that the firms may realize that they will be
aUowed after somewaitinglagtopassonas a higher priceatleastsome
fractionoftheirincreasesinperunit productioncosts. Eventhis simple
feature ofBelgian price regulation may have serious economic reper-
cussions.
A first question is whether the delayed pass-through of cost in-
creases dampens thefirm's incentive to employ low-pricedinputs in its
production.
Itis importantto note that this issue does not pertainto substitution
ofdifferent inputs (say labor and capital) norto the weU known aUega-
tion that firms may inflate cost accounting data in their notification
dossiers. Here we focus onthe possible incentive, due to price regula-
tion, to increase external factor prices, to switch to higher-priced
varieties of input sources and to chaUenge less vigorously factor price
increasesin situationswherefirms possessbargainingpowerin relation
to their suppliers. Intuitively one canroughly think ofsuch tendencies
as efforts to obtain higher prices through the promotionofincreases in
selected cost items.
External factor prices (for instance offuel) need not necessarily be
exogenous. An old example is the United States vs. Socony-Vacuum
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gasoline set the price based on the prevailing spot marketprice. Indus-
try members agreed to buy «excess» gasoline in the spot market in
order to raise the spot and hence contract prices.
Both in the United States and the United Kingdom it has recently
been alleged (Baron and De Bondt (1978a), Price Commission (1978)
that fuel adjustment clauses encourage tl;le purchase ofhigher priced
input sources. (The substitutability ofdifferent inputs would normally
tend to eliminate price differences, but market imperfections such as
those created by government intervention can cause such differentials
to persist). Fueladjustment clauses allow electric utilities to automati-
cally pass on to consumers increases in fuel prices according to a
calculation formula. The clauses can be compared with price calcula-
tion contracts oreven with prior notification price regulation when the
price increases are limited to passing on changes in production costand
receive little or no scrutinity by the Belgian regulatory authorities.
Baronand De Bondt(1978b) demonstratedthattheincentiveto employ
input sources with higher real prices is presentonly when the produc-
tion technology is characterized by decreasing returns to scale.
Price regulation mechanisms mayalso affect the wage bargaining
between firms and unions. For example, when firms are making low
profits, they may believe that the probability that they will be allowed a
price increase in response to an increase in cost is high (Hendricks
(1975)). This may create an incentive for frrms to agre for a higher wage
increasethanmightresultwithoutregulationbecausethis mayimprove
the chances to offset the profit loss through increased prices. A va-
riation on this incentive may be present with firms interestedin obtai-
ning (a prolongation of) price calculation contracts.
Belgian price mechanisms may possess some features that could
counteract the above-mentioned effects through a reduction of the
magnitude ofthe pass through ofcost increases or by an increase in the
length ofthe waiting lag. Our work provides some indication that the
latterfeature may have more predictabie results on the desired effects
than the pass through.
A second question is whether the price regulation mechanisms
create an incentive for firms to bias their choice of a production
technology.
The issue of overcapitalization or the so-called Averch-Johnson
effect has dominated the literature on the side-effects of U.S. public
utility regulation (Averech and Johnson (1962), Kahn (1971), Bailey
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following a regulatory review which can be compared to the Belgian
prior notification procedure. One of the many differences with the
Belgian system is that in the U.S. prices are determined with the
explicit regulatory requirement thatfirms are not allowed to earn more
than a specified rate-of-return on invested capital. The Averch-John-
son thesis is that this rate-of-return regulation creates an incentive for
the regulated firms to employ more capital relative to other inputs to
produce any given output than is efficient. The debate on the desc-
riptiveandontheempiricalrelevanceofthiseffectcontinues. Although
not directly relevant for the Belgian regulation where rate-of-return
considerations are atbestpresenteitherimplicit oras onlyane ofmany
regulatory considerations, the Averch-Johnson proposition suggests
that the Belgian regulation schemes mayalso produce biases in choice
of technology.
Someinsights onthisissueemergedfrom ourresearch(Baron andDe
Bondt 1978a)). Suppose a firm or sector anticipates an increase in the
future in some factor input price (say oflabor) relative to other input
prices. Recognizing that increases in unit costs causedby increases in
the factor prices can only be passed on as higher prices after some
waiting lag, it will choose a more labor intensive technology than it
would otherwise provided regulation is effective. Effective regulation
means that price increases are lower than what the firm would prefer
them to be. The biased choice constitues an effort to counteract the
regulatory restrictions on output price increases, since it results in
larger increases in unit costs and hereby in higher prices than without
such a bias. This is optimal for the firm if it is unable to obtain the
desired price increases through other means. An enlargement of the
waiting lag ora decreaseinthe pass through can be usedto counteract
this tendency. If new prices are calculated solely on the basis of
rate-of-return considerations, however, a firm may, but need not,
choose a less labor intensive technology provided that the required
rate-of-return oninvestedcapitalis low. Inthis case an enlargementof
the lag will promote the adoption of more capital intensive technolo-
gies. Our novel predictions are the reverse ofearlier Averch-Johnson
propositions. Only when the required rate-of-return is large will over-
capitalizationresult whichcanbecounteractedbyanincreasedwaiting
lag.
Theseresults clearly illustratethatprice regulation mechanisms may
create incentives for firms to adopt technolog~es that would not be
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that it can affect output prices through its choice oftechnology and on
other measures taken by the regulators to counter these effects. The
analysis of the empirical relevance of these predictions still awaits
initiation for Belgium.
A further question is whether the waiting lag associated with the
prior notification procedure does not preventfirms from maintaining
financial viability and raising cl1pital.
A positive response is often given by the industries subject to these
(and other) price regulation mechanisms (see, for instance, Federatie
der chemische nijverheid van België (1977)). In the United States and
some European countries this argument is sometimes used to support
price calculation regulation with automatic price adjustments. AI-
though Belgian calculation contracts are not attractive to industry
(because ofthe price decrease clauses ?), cable television distributors
recently argued along similar lines to be exempted from the prior
notification procedure and to obtain a price calculation contract (Ver-
meulen (1976)).
There can be little argument that a long waiting lag can indeed have
an adverse effect on profitability when productivity improvements do
not offset increased production costs. A deteriorated profitability in
turn may induce incentives to raise export prices, to reduce R & D
activities, etc...
These adverse effects are not a sufficient reason to keep the waiting
lag as small as possible because they could be counteracted, for in-
stance, by granting higher output increases the larger the lag or by
allowing the opportunity ofa limited temporary price increase during
the waiting lag. Moreover the lag has macroeconomic, administrative
and possibly microeconomic functions as suggested above.
A related issue is : what are the effects ofuncertainty on the mag-
nitude (or timing)ofthe allowedprice increaseforthepriornotification
mechanism?
Firms (ora sector) notifyinga price increasemay notknowon which
criteria the Minister of Economic Affairs will base his decision. The
elementsguidingthe decisions (employment, profitability, income dis-
tribution, rate ofinflation) may be changing over time and overindus-
tries both in number and ponderance and may in part depend on the
relative bargaining powerofthe members ofthe Price Commission (or
the permanente committee). Consequently, there may be uncertainty
as the price increase that will be granted. Although there may be
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pose explicit and publicized criteria, one should realize that such un-
certainty about government intervention may further temper the in-
centives for private investments (Nickell (1977)).
Finally,priceregulation mechanismscan also affectotheraspectsof
firm behavior and decision making with respect to productivity im-
provements and non-price as weil as price-competition.
The prior notification regulation and the calculation formula may
affectincentives to increaseproductivity, sincecostreducingactivities
maybediscouragediftheyweakenthecasefor thefuture priceincrease
(Kendrick (1975)). A tendency for endogenous cost elements to be-
come relatively more important vis à vis exogenous cost items in the
notification dossiers could be seen as a signalofthe relevance ofthis
side-effect. The possible counteracting force ofthe waiting lag (Bailey
(1974)) is likely to be diminished given the frequency ofthe notifica-
tions.
The price regulation mechanisms mayalso cause firms to retain
rather than pass on cost savings due to productivity gains into lower
prices. Cost accounting approaches to price calculation could further
stimulate this. Is it not conceivable that output prices are allowed to
increasein responseto anincreaseinsome costcomponents,while per
unitcostsare actuallydecreasingbecauseofanincreaseindemandand
increasing returns to scale ? A positive answer would explain in part
theincentivecreatedbythemechanismforfirms toadvertise morethan
they would otherwise.
Price regulation mechanisms temper the incentives for price-com-
petitionas arguedin sectiontwo, andhencenon-pricecompetitionmay
gain in importance. Industry rivalry is howeverofteneliminatedentai-
ling a reduction ofstimuli for innovative activities. This tempering of
the incentive to innovate appears less relevant the more important
foreign competition is on domestic and international markets. Tech-
nological change activities mayalso adversely be affected by inade-
quate profitability if only because this retards the growth of internal
funds orbecauseitrestrictsorrendersmorecostlytheaccesstooutside
financing. Theexclusionof«new» productsfrom thenotificationrequi-
rement may create incentives for trivial product chances and waste of
resources. Research is clearly needed to determine how alterations to
price regulation mechanisms may be made to counteract undesirable
impacts on non-price competition.
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The design problem canbe statedas foUows : to choose a price regula-
tion mechanism that retards price increases in accord with the objecti-
yes ofindustrial policy recognizing thatthe mechanismitselfwill affect
industry and firm behavior and performance. The emphasis in this
section is on the dimensions of the design problem rather than on its
solution.
A major difficulty in the design ofregulatory mechanisms involves
specifying operationaUy acceptable goals ofindustrial policy. The es-
sence ofthis difficulty may be viewed as finding a weighting between
possible objectives such as the maximization of employment, the as-
surance of an adequate rate-of-return on invested capital, and the
minimization of the level of prices. The Belgian regulators use an
(implicit) weighting which is more complex, sometimes changing, and
certainly unknown to the researcher because of the secrecy of the
regulatory investigations and deliberations. One may wonder whether
theirponderations arenotbiasedtowards myopic private industry and
union labor interest.
At present maximization of employment in the short-run would
appear to be an overriding concern to the Belgian price regulators. In
the United States the objectives of regulation have recently moved
stronglytowardstheminimizationofprices(maximizationofconsumer
surplus) subject toprofitability constraintsto assure rate-of-returns on
investedcapital.Itis notclearwhetheritwouldbeappropriateto adopt
suchan objective in Belgium, sincewhatis goodfor a marketeconomy
is notnecessarilygoodfor a mixedmarketeconomy. A largeremphasis
on the minimization ofprices would nevertheless be reasonable, par-
ticularly since consumers are likely to be less weU organized than are
industryorlaborgroups andhence less effectiveinbringingpressureto
bear on the regulatory process. The objective ofminimizing prices is
not equivalent to limiting price increases, since the latter may be zero
while the level ofprices may still be too high. An overriding macroeco-
nomic policy view, a domination of price regulation authorities by
privateindustry andunionlaborinterests, notto mentionthe argument
that distribution and notproductioncauses high consumer prices must
haveresultedin a diminishedconcernforthe fact thatforsomefirms or
sectors the level of prices is unreasonably high. In some cases one
eventuaUy learns about excessive pricesfrom the emergence ofimport
competition, but in other sectors with important barries to entry such
261competition may not occur. A lack ofemphasis on the microeconomic
appropriate level ofprices and costs aggravates some ofthe incentives
discussed earlier (for instance to search for cost reducing techniques)
and has wel known detrimental effects on the aUocation ofresources
and employment in the long-run. The objectives of industrial (or any
sectorial) policy should include the minimization of the prices. A
micro-economization of economic policy is vacuous otherwise.
Theoretical and applied research on the design of price regulation
mechanisms is possible gi"en explicit criteria ofindustrial policy and
availability ofdata. MethodologicaUy this canbe approached using the
framework of agency models (see Baron and De Bondt (1978c) and
Goldberg (1976). The broad perspectives of this research are the fol-
lowing. Textbook economics essentially deals with the incentives
created by the operation of the market system. The problem is that
such insights become increasingly less relevant as we move to a more
mixedeconomy since government interventions, such asprice regula-
tion mechanisms, weaken the market forces and replace the market
incentives with systems thatof ten have unknown or unexplored incen-
tiveproperties. A studyofthe alternative incentive systems takinginto
accountinstitutionalandotherconstraints mustprecedetheircompari-
son with the market mechanism.
Less fundamental approaches are also possible and may give more
immediateresults. To avoida deadlockinvolvedinformulating explicit
criteria for industrial policy it may be better to attempt to agree on a
number of principles that acceptable price regulation mechanisms
shouldpossess. Forexample, suchprinciples might include incentives
for productivity increases, encouragement of price competition, and
incentives that would stimulate innovative activities and minimize the
inneficient choice oftechnology and wasteful non-price competition.
6. Summary
This paper has attempted to refocus the discussion of Belgian price
regulation from the marcoeconomic level to the industrial economie
level. Itwas conjectured that the continued existence ofBelgian price
regulationmay weU be explainedby microeconomic insteadof~arcoe­
conomic considerations. The statues may notonly be in the interestof
the govemment but also in the private interests ofindustry and union
laborandthis more so, ceteris paribus, the less concentratedand more
labor intensive the industry is. The most basic aspects of the price
262regulation mechanisms maycreatenewincentives which canaddto the
private and social costs of these regulatory instruments and ought,
therefore, to be carefully evaluated and investigated. Some aspects of
the design problemassociated with price regulation mechanisms were
identified. Such a design could be guided by acceptable goals ofindus-
trialpolicy oratleastby agreementondesirabieincentiveproperties. A
refocus ofpriceregulation in particularandgovernmentinterventionin
general at the industrial and microeconomic level appears warranted
with a renewed emphasis on the appropriate level of producer and
consumer prices.
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